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CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE LETTER
AND THE SPIRIT OF THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
RALPH A. RossuM*
I. INTRODUCTION
Writing in a 1979 issue of The Public Interest, Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan puzzled over the question, "What do you do
when the Supreme Court is wrong?"' Short of impeachment, the
only responses he could identify were "debate, litigate, legislate."2
He never so much as acknowledged the existence, much less the
possible employment, of Congress' power to curtail the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court.3 Events, however, have passed Senator
Moynihan by. Over a score of bills were introduced in the Ninety-
Seventh Congress to deprive the Supreme Court of appellate juris-
diction either to hear cases involving such issues as abortion rights
and voluntary prayer in the public schools or to order school bus-
* Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of
Justice. Associate Professor of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago. B.A., Concor-
dia College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Chicago.
1. Moynihan, What Do You Do When the Supreme Court Is Wrong? 57 PuB. INTEREST 3
(1979).
2. Id. at 8.
3. Proposals to employ art. III, § 2 of the United States Constitution to limit the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have been debated throughout our constitutional
history. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SuPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); W. MURPHY, CON-
GRESS AND THE COURT (1962); Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND.
L. REV. 925 (1965).
A subsidiary question concerns Congress' power to curb the jurisdiction of the lower fed-
eral courts, leaving issues to be decided solely in the state courts. It is generally conceded
that Congress could substantially reduce the authority of these courts or even abolish them
altogether. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1973); Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdic-
tion of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical View and New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45
(1975); Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal
Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976); Sager, Foreword: Consti-
tutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981). This Article addresses Congress' power to limit the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts only in relation to the central question under consid-
eration. See infra note 173.
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ing to achieve racial balance. Many of these same proposals were
reintroduced in the Ninety-Eighth Congress.4 These measures have
in turn prompted considerable scholarly attention and controversy.
Symposia in Judicature,5 the Villanova Law Review,6 and the
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy,7 seminars sponsored
by the American Enterprise Institutes and the Free Congress Re-
search and Education Foundation,9 hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee,0
and the foreword to the Harvard Law Review's analysis of the 1980
Term of the United States Supreme Court" all have been devoted
to the questions of whether and to what extent Congress can or
should strip the Court of appellate subject matter jurisdiction.
On the surface, these measures would appear to be wholly within
the constitutional authority of Congress.' 2 After all, article III, sec-
tion 2 of the United States Constitution provides that
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate Juris-
4. See S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), which would deprive lower federal courts of
jurisdiction in cases involving state or local abortion law. See also H.R. 618, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). Similarly, the following bills would deprive the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, of jurisdiction in cases involving voluntary prayer in public schools. S. 88,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 525, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 253, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). A final group of bills would, in varying degrees, limit the jurisdiction of all
federal courts to order school desegregation through mandatory busing. H.R. 798, 98th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1983); H.R. 158, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
5. Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction, 65 JUDICATURE 177 (1981).
6. Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 VML. L. REV. 893 (1982).
7. 6 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y (Special Issue 1983).
8. On October 1 and 2, 1981, the American Enterprise Institute held a seminar in Wash-
ington, D.C., the topic of which was "Judicial Power in the United States: What Are the
Appropriate Constraints?"
9. The title of the Foundation's seminar, held in Washington, D.C. on June 14, 1982, was
"A Conference on Judicial Reform."
10. Constitutional Restraints Upon the Judiciary: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm. to Define the Scope of the Senate's Authority
Under Article III of the Constitution to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
11. Sager, supra note 3.
12. This Article does not consider whether these specific measures are properly drafted
and technically correct. It considers only whether Congress has the power constitutionally to
pass such measures. See infra note 19.
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diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.13
For many students of constitutional law, the simple reading of
these words ends the matter.14 The language is clear and, for them,
conclusive. As Justice Noah Swayne observed in United States v.
Hartwelll5 over a century ago: "If the language be clear it is con-
clusive. There can be no construction where there is nothing to
construe.""
This understanding of Congress' power to curtail the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is reinforced by Ex Parte Mc-
Cardle, the only Supreme Court decision that has directly ad-
dressed this issue. In this post-Civil War case, the Court unani-
mously upheld a law that stripped the Court of authority to hear
appeals from persons imprisoned during the Civil War who sought
release from custody under an 1867 habeas corpus statute. Repub-
lican leaders in Congress feared that the Supreme Court, which
had already indicated hostility toward the Reconstruction pro-
gram, would use McCardle to hold much of that program unconsti-
tutional. Consequently, Congress repealed the 1867 act on which
McCardle's appeal was founded. This was an obvious attempt by
Congress to use the exceptions clause to deprive the Court of its
appellate power to review the substantive constitutionality of con-
gressional acts. Moreover, the repealing act was not passed until
after the case already had been argued before the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the Court at once dismissed the case for want of ju-
risdiction. As Chief Justice Chase explained:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the Legis-
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
14. See E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 109 (8th ed. 1979);
E. CORWIN, THE CONSTrFUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 179 (1974); BERGER, Congres-
sional Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 801; Roberts, Now Is the
Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949); Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965). See also 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 947-51 (May 30, 1981) (statements of Professors Martin H. Redish, Paul Bator, and
John T. Noonan).
15. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1868).
16. Id. at 396. See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
16 (1980) ("The most important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional
language itself.").
17. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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lature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitu-
tion; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate juris-
dicton of this court is given by express words.
What, then, is the effect of the repealing Act upon the case
before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is the
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause.18
For many scholars, then, the constitutional text, supplemented
by the Court's reflections on it in McCardle, answers any questions
concerning the constitutionality of measures restricting the juris-
diction of the Court. As they see it, the only real question raised by
congressional initiatives diminishing the Court's appellate juris-
dicton is "the wisdom of doing so.""10
Not everyone, however, is willing to concede that these measures
raise only policy questions.20 Opinion on the constitutionality of
congressional curtailment of the Court's appellate jurisdiction is
divided, for there are those who argue that such a power could de-
stroy the Court's power of judicial review and, ultimately, under-
mine our constitutional system of separation of powers.21 They fear
18. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514.
19. E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, supra note 14, at 179. This Article does not address the
"wisdom" of the bills discussed supra note 4, nor does it explore the policy questions they
raise. Rather, it is limited exclusively to a consideration of Congress' constitutional power to
enact such measures.
20. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 155-57 (1968); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 53-54 (1980); C. PRITCHETr, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT
(1961); 0. STEPHENS & G. RATHJEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ALLOCATION OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWER 40 (1980); Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Excep-
tions Clause, 53 ORE. L. REV. 3 (1973); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAxv. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Merry,
Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53
(1962); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Sager, supra note 3. Even John Hart Ely, who writes
that the constitutional language itself is "the most important datum" bearing upon what the
Constitution means, nonetheless concludes that "Congress' theoretical power to withdraw
the Court's jurisdiction over certain classes of cases is . .. fraught with constitutional
doubt." ELY, supra note 16, at 46.
21. See, e.g., C. PRITCHETr, supra note 20, at 122; Brant, supra note 20, at 21. Even
among those who deny that Congress has the power to curtail the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion, opinion is divided over whether "any legislation of this sort [is] unconstitutional as a
[Vol. 24:385
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that if Congress had the power to deprive the Supreme Court of its
appellate jurisdiction, Congress could constitutionally "deny liti-
gants Supreme Court review in cases involving bills of attainder, ex
post facto laws, freedom of speech, press and religion, unreasona-
ble search and seizure, equal protection of the laws, right to coun-
sel, and compulsory self-incrimination."22 This parade of imaginary
horrors convinces some commentators that Congress can no longer
claim with good conscience the authority to curtail the Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction, 23 and should Congress nevertheless proceed to
exercise this authority, the Supreme Court ought not to tolerate
it, 24 but rather ought to invalidate the offending measure.2 5
Those who argue against Congress' power to make exceptions to
the Court's appellate jurisdiction find themselves in a most uncom-
fortable bind. They are forced to deny an explicit power of Con-
gress, expressly granted by the Constitution, in order to protect
the Court's implicit power of judicial review, a power which has no
textual basis.28 To extricate themselves from this bind, they com-
monly advance an argument that has much in common with the
argument advanced by the Court in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber.27 In that case, Justice Brennan observed that "a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit .... ,,28 Similarly, those who
would limit Congress' power to curtail the Court's appellate juris-
diction argue that congressional power to make exceptions may be
violation of the separation of powers and as an attack on the status and independence of the
nation's highest judicial tribunal," C. PR1rCHETT, THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN CONSnTUTIONAL
LAW 15 (1978), or whether legislation is unconstitutional only if it deprives the Supreme
Court of its essential role of interpreting the Constitution and resolving conflicts between
federal laws and between state and federal laws. See Hart, supra note 20, at 1365; Ratner,
supra note 20, at 160-61.
22. Brant, supra note 20, at 5. See also Ratner, supra note 20, at 158.
23. C. PRITCHEr, supra note 20, at 122.
24. Slonim, Law Scope: Say Dormant Prayer Bill Has Broad Implications, 66 A.B.A.J.
437 (1980) (quoting Lawrence Tribe).
25. Brant, supra note 20, at 28.
26. Raoul Berger acknowledges this bind: "The distressing fact is that Congress' power to
make 'exceptions' to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is expressly conferred
whereas judicial review ... is derived from questionable implications and debatable his-
tory." R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 4.
27. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
28. Id. at 201.
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within the letter of article III and yet not constitutional, because
not compatible with the spirit of judicial review.2 9 Justice Rehn-
quist, dissenting in Weber, remarked that Justice Brennan's line of
argument was worthy "not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and
Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini . "3... 0 The same
criticism is appropriate with regard to the interpretation of the ex-
ceptions clause, and perhaps even more so. At least in Weber, if
the Court were mistaken in preferring the statute's spirit over its
letter, the mistake could be easily rectified, because "Congress may
set a different [statutory] course if it so chooses." ' A mistaken in-
terpretation of the exceptions clause would be difficult to rectify,
however, because a different course can be set only by constitu-
tional amendment.
The debate over Congress' power to make exceptions has been
curious. One side cites the letter of article III and concludes that
Congress' power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction is absolute:
"The power to make exceptions to Supreme Court appellate juris-
dicton is a plenary power. It is given in express terms and without
limitation, regardless of the more modest uses that might have
been anticipated. . . .In short, the clause is complete exactly as it
stands."32 The opposition in this debate invokes the spirit of judi-
cial review and insists that "the long accepted power of ultimate
resolution of constitutional questions by the Supreme Court" must
29. Jesse Choper adopts this position: "The theoretical underpinnings for a wide legisla-
tive power to curtail the appellate jurisdiction. . . are hardly as firm as the literal phrasing
of Article III and the quite sweeping judicial language would suggest." J. CHOPER, supra
note 20, at 53.
30. 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 229, 260
(1973). See also Roberts, supra note 14. "What is there to prevent Congress taking away, bit
by bit, all the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States...? I see
nothing, I do not see any reason why Congress cannot, if it elects to do so, take away en-
tirely the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. . . ." Id. at 4. For this reason, for-
mer Justice Roberts favored a constitutional amendment that would have stripped the Con-
gress of its art. III powers. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 10-(testimony of Thomas R.
Ascik, Paul M. Bator, Jules Gerard, Martin H. Redish, and Charles E. Rice); A. KELLY & W.
HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 483 (4th ed. 1970);
A. MASON & W. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 24 (6th ed. 1978); Burton, Two
Significant Decisions: Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte McCardle, 41 A.B.A.J. 124, 176
(1955).
[Vol. 24:385
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not be disturbed.3 3 Given the nature of this debate, neither side
can win, because each is talking past the other.3" There is, how-
ever, a clear loser-the Constitution, which is presented as a fatal-
ly flawed document that neither says what it means nor means
what it says. This Article asserts that the Constitution is not
flawed in this respect and that the spirit of judicial review is alto-
gether consistent with the letter of Congress' powers under article
III. This Article will examine the arguments on behalf of Congress'
power to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction and
systematically challenge the spirited objections of those who seek
to protect the Court's power to interpret the Constitution by ignor-
ing the Constitution.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR PLENARY CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Those who argue that Congress has plenary power over the
Court's appellate jurisdiction present a straightforward case based
on three kinds of evidence: the text of the Constitution; the inten-
tion of the framers; and the firm, consistent, and unwavering un-
derstanding of the Supreme Court. Although further consideration
of the clear and conclusive words of article III is unnecessary, an
examination of what the framers meant when they used those
words and how the Supreme Court has interpreted them is in
order.
A. The Intent of the Framers
No evidence in the records either of the Federal Convention of
1787 or of the various state ratifying conventions would indicate
that Alexander Hamilton's words in The Federalist, No. 80 were
not representative of the understanding of virtually the entire
founding generation. In that essay, Hamilton reviewed in detail the
powers of the federal judiciary and observed that "[i]f some partial
inconveniences should appear to be connected with the incorpora-
tion of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected that
33. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MINORITY REPORT ON THE OMNIBUS CRIMINAL CONTROL AND
SAE STREETS ACT OF 1967, S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as MINORITY REPORT]. See also Hearings, supra note 10 (testimony of George J. Alex-
ander, Edward I. Cutler, Lloyd M. Cutler, Leonard G. Ratner, and Telford Taylor).
34. For an exception to this generalization, see Van Alstyne, supra note 32.
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the national legislature will have ample authority to make such ex-
ceptions and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to
obviate or remove these inconveniences. '3 5
The Federal Convention spent very little time debating the ju-
risdiction of the federal judiciary.3 6 On July 24, nearly two months
after the Convention began, the delegates agreed to submit the va-
rious resolutions they had approved to the Committee of Detail, so
that it might "report a Constitution comfortable to the Resolutions
passed by the Convention. ' 37 Their submission concerning the fed-
eral judiciary was most rudimentary: "[T]he jurisdiction of the na-
tional Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws
passed by the general Legislature, and to such other Questions as
involve the national Peace and Harmony."38 Nevertheless, the
Committee of Detail transformed this vague resolution into lan-
guage that is almost identical to article III, section 2. After defin-
ing the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the committee pro-
vided that "in all the other cases before mentioned, it [jurisdiction]
shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the Legislature shall make." 9
Although the Report of the Committee of Detail was presented
to the Convention on August 6, 1787, the judicial article was not
taken up for consideration until August 27. On that date, Dr.
Samuel Johnson of Connecticut suggested that the power of the
judiciary ought to extend to equity as well as law-and moved to
insert the words "both in law and equity" after the words U.S.4 0
This proposal was adopted. After an intervening discussion, "Mr.
Governeur Morris [of Pennsylvania] wished to know what was
meant by the words 'In all the cases beforementioned it (jurisdic-
tion) shall be appellate with such exceptions &c,' whether it ex-
tended to matters of fact as well as law-and to cases of Common
law as well as Civil law."'41 James Wilson, the principal architect of
the draft reported by the Committee of Detail, answered that the
35. THE FEDERALiST, No. 80, at 541 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
36. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 22, 46 (rev. ed. 1937).
37. Id. at 106.
38. Id. at 132-33.
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id. at 428.
41. Id. at 431.
[Vol. 24:385
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committee meant "facts as well as law & Common as well as Civil
law."' 42 No comments were forthcoming from other members of the
Committee, presumably indicating their agreement with Wilson's
answer. To remove all doubt, however, Mr. Dickinson of Delaware
moved to add the words "both as to law & fact" after the word
"appellate," which was agreed to by unanimous consent.43
Acceptance of this addition concluded the discussion. 4 No ques-
tions were raised concerning Congress' plenary power to make ex-
ceptions. The conclusion is inescapable: both the words chosen by
the delegates and the discussion surrounding their choice of these
words suggest an unlimited congressional power over the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. John Marshall accurately summarized the
delegates' intentions when he declared in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention that "Congress is empowered to make exceptions to
the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme
Court. These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may
think proper for the interest and liberty of the people."4 5
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. But see Brant, supra note 20, at 7. Brant correctly points out that subsequent to
Dickinson's motion, an unidentified delegate moved to insert the following substitute for the
clause on appellate jurisdiction: "In all the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power
shall be exercised in such a manner as the Legislature shall direct." 2 M. FARRAND, supra
note 36, at 431. This motion was defeated, six states to two. Brant argues that this proposed
clause "would have given Congress the extensive power it claims it possesses under the au-
thority to make exceptions from the Court's appellate jurisdiction. It is hardly conceivable
that such a motion would have been offered if the delegates believed that they had just
voted to confer substantially the same power under a different wording." Brant, supra note
20, at 7. See also Merry, supra note 20, at 59; Sager, supra note 20, at 49-50 n.95. Brant
argues that Congress is authorized under art. I, § 2 to make exceptions only to the Court's
review of matters of fact. See generally infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text Brant's
argument fails, however, because he is mistaken in his assertion that the power to determine
how the judicial power shall be exercised is substantially the same as the power to make
exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The former power, in fact, is much greater,
and the delegates understood this. Brant does not appreciate that it is one thing for Con-
gress to have power to determine what cases the Supreme Court shall hear in its appellate
jurisdiction, but quite another for Congress to have power to determine what the outcome of
those cases shall be.
45. 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONsTrrUmON 560 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1888).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:385
B. The Court's Consistent Support for Plenary Congressional
Power
Although "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what [the judges] have said about it," 46
it is nevertheless significant to observe that the Supreme Court's
holdings concerning the exceptions clause are altogether consistent
with both the express words of article III, section 2, and the mani-
fest intention of the framers.47 The Court, of course, has addressed
directly an actual congressional contraction of its appellate juris-
diction only once.48 Nevertheless, it has on numerous occasions
taken the opportunity to reflect more generally on the nature and
extent of Congress' article III powers. A brief consideration of
these reflections reveals the Court's firm and unwavering under-
standing from the opening days of the republic to the present.
In the first of the relevant cases, Wiscart v. Dauchy,49 Chief Jus-
tice Oliver Ellsworth acknowledged that "even the [Court's] appel-
late jurisdiction is. . . qualified; inasmuch as it is given 'with such
exceptions, and under such regulations, as Congress shall
make.' ,5o He then drew what he considered to be the necessary
conclusion from the Court's qualified jurisdiction: "If Congress has
46. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
47. "The government body most ready to assert the power of Congress to deprive the
Court of its appellate jurisdiction has been the Court itself." Comment, Removal of Su-
preme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: A Weapon Against Obscenity?" 1969 DuKE L.J. 291,
297 n.37. In fact, no justice has ever denied Congress' broad powers under art. 1Il. Although
Justice Douglas did declare in his dissent in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11
(1962), that "[tihere is a serious question whether the McCardle case could command a
majority today," and although this passage frequently is cited in writings that suggest that
the contemporary Supreme Court would not accept congressional restrictions of its appel-
late jurisdiction equivalent to those upheld in McCardle, the context of Justice Douglas'
dictum suggests something quite different; namely, if Congress were to attempt to deprive-
the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over a case that is already under judicial consideration,
then it is questionable whether McCardle would be followed today. Douglas subsequently
expressed his understanding of the broader question of Congress' power over the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in his concurrence in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968):
"As respects our appellate jurisdiction, Congress may largely fashion it as Congress desires
by reason of the express provisions of § 2, art. ITI. See Ex Parte McCardle. . . ." Id. at 109.
48. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). For a discussion of McCardle, see
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
49. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
50. Id. at 327.
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provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an
appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart
from it." 51 Ellsworth's opinion is especially weighty, as he had been
a delegate to the Federal Convention and had served on the Com-
mittee of Detail that drafted the exceptions clause.
Ellsworth's conception of the Court's jurisdiction continued in
an unwavering line through five consecutive chief justices. 2 Thus,
Chief Justice John Marshall in United States v. More53 argued
that an affirmative grant of certain appellate power by Congress is
an implied denial of all appellate power not mentioned: "[A]s the
jurisdiction of the court has been described, it has been regulated
by congress, and an affirmative description of its power must be
understood as a regulation, under the constitution, prohibiting the
exercise of other powers than those described." Marshall elabo-
rated upon this argument in Durousseau v. United States:55
The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial
act. They are given by the constitution. But they are limited and
regulated by the judicial act, and by such other acts as have
been passed on the subject. When the first legislature of the
Union proceeded to carry the third article of the constitution
51. Id.
52. To the extent that differences of opinion arose among them, such differences were
only over the question of whether the Court's appellate jurisdiction was originally granted
by the Constitution or by the Congress. Three different answers were given. The first main-
tained that any withdrawal of the Court's appellate jurisdiction requires Congress to make a
positive exception. All constitutionally granted jurisdiction not positively excepted by Con-
gress is retained by the Court. This was the view of Justice James Wilson in his opinion in
Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 326. The second approach was that the Court pos-
sesses no appellate jurisdiction unless positively granted by Congress. The Court's appellate
jurisdiction is viewed as congressionally granted rather than as constitutionally authorized.
This was the view of Chief Justice Ellsworth in Wiscart, see supra text accompanying note
50, and of Chief Justice Taney in Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-20 (1847), see
infra text accompanying note 57. The third approach combined features of the first two.
Like the first, it based the Court's appellate jurisdiction on the Constitution. However, once
Congress had acted to grant the Court appellate jurisdiction, this approach followed the
second approach and implicitly denied all jurisdiction not positively granted. This was the
view of Chief Justice Marshall in Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313-
14 (1810). See infra text accompanying note 56. See also Comment, supra note 47, at 297-
300.
53. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805).
54. Id. at 173.
55. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
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into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the
power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate ju-
risdiction of the supreme court. 6
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney, likewise acknowledged
the utter dependency of the Court's appellate jurisdiction upon
acts of Congress: "By the Constitution of the United States, the
Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless
conferred upon it by act of Congress; nor can it, when conferred,
be exercised in any other form, or by any other mode of proceed-
ing, than that which the law prescribes. 5
7
Chief Justice Chase's statements in McCardle concerning the
letter of article III, section 2 have already been considered.5 Chase
not only recognized Congress' power over the Court's appellate ju-
risdiction, but also made an important contribution to our under-
standing of the role of the Court: "[J]udicial duty is not less fitly
performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising
firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer. '15
Finally, in The "Francis Wright,'" Chief Justice Waite affirmed
and extended what his predecessors had argued:
What [the appellate powers of the Supreme Court] shall be, and
to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have
been, proper subjects of legislative control. Authority to limit
the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it authority to limit the
56. Id. at 313-14. See also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 453 (1833) ("It is apparent, then, that the exception was intended as a limi-
tation upon the preceding words, to enable Congress to regulate and restrain the appellate
power, as the public interests might, from time to time, require.").
57. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-20 (1847).
58. See supra text accompanying note 18. Chief Justice Chase's opinion in McCardle
echoed, for the most part, Justice Swayne's opinion for an equally unanimous Court in Dan-
iels v. Rock Island R.R., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250 (1854):
The original jurisdiction of this court, and its power to receive appellate juris-
diction, are created and defined by the Constitution; and the legislative depart-
ment of the government can enlarge neither one nor the other. But it is for
Congress to determine how far, within the limits of the capacity of this court to
take, appellate jurisdiction shall be given, and when conferred, it can be exer-
cised only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by law. In these respects,
it is wholly the creature of legislation.
Id. at 254.
59. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868).
60. 105 U.S. 381 (1881).
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use of the jurisdiction. Not only may whole classes be kept out
of the jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions
may be subjected to re-examination and review, while others are
not.6'
In the same opinion, Waite also referred to "the rule, which has
always been acted on since, that while the appellate power of this
court under the Constitution extends to all cases within the judi-
cial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the
power is confined within such limits as Congress sees fit to
prescribe. 6 2
Not all judicial support for the opinion that the letter of article
III, section 2 is clear and conclusive comes from eighteenth and
nineteenth century jurists. For example, while dissenting on other
issues in Yakus v. United States,3 Justice Wiley Rutledge un-
equivocally affirmed that "Congress has plenary power to confer or
withhold appellate jurisdiction."" Similarly, in National Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,6 5 Justice Frankfurter
noted that:
Congress need not establish inferior courts; Congress need not
grant the full scope of jurisdiction which it is empowered to vest
in them; Congress need not give this Court any appellate power;
it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it
may do so even while a case is sub judice. Ex parte McCardle
66
For many, then, the words of the Constitution, the intention of
the founding generation, and the unwavering opinion of the Su-
preme Court all clearly, consistently, and unequivocally reveal a
constitutional plan for the courts:
[That plan is] quite simply that the Congress could decide from
time to time how far the federal judicial institution should be
used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated
61. Id. at 386.
62. Id. at 385.
63. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
64. Id. at 472-73.
65. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
66. Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
567 (1962); Burton, supra note 32, at 176; Roberts, supra note 14, at 4.
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differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the
state courts, bound as they are by the Constitution as "the su-
preme law of the Land ...any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' 7
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ABSOLUTE CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER
THE COURT'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Those who place the spirit of judicial review over the letter of
article III and who insist that Congress' power under the excep-
tions clause is either limited or nonexistent make a variety of argu-
ments that can be reduced to seven general headings.6" One con-
tention is that those who rely on the letter of article III have
misconstrued the language of that article. A second contention in-
sists that Ex Parte McCardle69 is a very narrow holding with little
or no application beyond its facts. A third argument asserts that
the power Congress originally possessed under article III, section 2
has been effectively repealed by the passage of time. A fourth argu-
ment contends that Congress cannot make exceptions that would
destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court. A fifth and related
contention maintains that Congress' power to curtail the Court's
jurisdiction is qualified by the constitutional principles of separa-
tion of powers and federalism. A sixth claim argues that Congress
is limited in its ability to make exceptions by other constitutional
provisions, such as those found in the Bill of Rights and the four-
teenth amendment. Finally, a seventh argument contends that
congressional contraction of the Court's appellate jurisdiction can-
not be unconstitutionally motivated, that is to say Congress cannot
have as its goal or objective the displacement of a disfavored judi-
cial precedent.
What animates those who make these arguments is their convic-
tion that the spirit of judicial review is jeopardized by the letter of
article III. Because those who contend that Congress has plenary
power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction generally have been
content to rely simply on the letter of the Constitution and have
67. Wechsler, supra note 14, at 1005-06. Under this plan, "Congress has the power by
enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess." Id.
68. Not everyone who would limit Congress' power under art. I, § 2 relies on all seven of
these arguments. Some of these arguments contradict each other.
69. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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felt no particular obligation or rebut these arguments, these gen-
eral claims have gone largely unchallenged.70 Little effort has been
made to show that the traditional concept of judicial review 1 is
wholly consonant with the letter of article III. In the following
analysis of these arguments, such an effort will be made.
A. The Argument from Textual Construction
The first of the arguments against Congress' plenary powers
under the exceptions clause is that those who rely on the letter of
article III have misconstrued the meaning of its words. Variations
of this argument exist, with Leonard Ratner focusing on how the
word "exceptions" was commonly used at the time of the Federal
Convention, 2 and with such scholars as Irving Brant, 3 Henry
Merry,7 4 and Raoul Berger 5 concerning themselves with the mean-
ing of the phrase "both as to Law and Fact."
From a survey of dictionaries existing at the time of the Federal
Convention, Ratner finds that an exception was generally defined
"as an exclusion from the application of a general rule or descrip-
tion."7 This definition indicates that "an exception cannot destroy
the essential characteristics of the subject to which it applies. '77
On this basis, Ratner argues that Congress' power to make excep-
tions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction is not plenary; any ex-
ceptions it makes must be narrower in application than the
description of the Court's entire appellate jurisdiction. 8 This os-
70. Intelligent exceptions to this generalization are Rice, Limiting Federal Court Juris-
diction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress Today, 65 JuDICATURE 190
(1981); Van Astyne, supra note 32.
71. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). On the difference be-
tween the traditional and modem forms of judicial review, see Wolfe, A Theory of U.S.
Constitutional History, 43 J. POL. 292 (1981).
72. Ratner, supra note 20, at 168-71.
73. Brant, supra note 20.
74. Merry, supra note 20.
75. R. BERGER, supra note 3. Berger, however, subsequently qualified his position. See
Berger, supra note 14.
76. Ratner, supra note 20, at 168.
77. Id. at 170.
78. Sager agrees with Ratner's interpretation:
An "exception" implies a minor deviation from a surviving norm; it is a nibble,
not a bite. And there is reason to think that this sense of the term was, if
anything, clearer at the time the Constitution was drafted than now. The lan-
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tensible limitation on Congress' power, however, is essentially
meaningless. If an exception implies some residuum of jurisdiction,
Congress can meet this test by excluding everything but, for exam-
ple, patent cases. As one of the interlocutors in Henry Hart's fa-
mous dialogue remarks: "This is so absurd, and it is so impossible
to lay down any measure of a necessary reservation, that it seems
to me the language of the Constitution must be taken as vesting
plenary control in Congress. '79
A more ingenious, if ultimately no more successful variation of
this argument against Congress' plenary power under article III,
section 2 focuses on the meaning of the phrase, "both as to Law
and Fact." Those who make this argument refuse to concede that
the framers of the Constitution intended to vest Congress with the
power to effect the wholesale destruction of judicial review. Rather,
they insist, the "sole purpose of the exceptions clause was to per-
mit Congress to limit appellate jurisdiction over questions of fact
in cases at law.""" Irving Brant, a noted historian, provides the
most recent and sophisticated version of this argument. He con-
tends that as a result of an unfortunate placement of commas in
the phrase, "Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact," the words
"both as to Law and Fact" appear to be a parenthetical, and the
modifying clause beginning "with such Exceptions" seems to at-
tach to "Jurisdiction," when, in fact, what the entire exceptions
clause was meant to modify is simply appellate jurisdiction of
guage of Article III from which Congress draws its authority to limit the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, thus contains only a bounded power to make
exceptions.
Sager, supra note 3, at 44.
79. Hart, supra note 20, at 1364. Ratner recognizes this and concedes ultimately that
"general usage... cannot provide a definitive interpretation," whereupon he launches into
an "essential role of the Court" argument of the kind discussed infra notes 123-32 and ac-
companying text. Ratner, supra note 20, at 171. Sager likewise acknowledges the difficulty
of textual interpretation: "To be sure, there is nothing self-evident about the precise limits
of Congress' authority in such an amorphous grant, but this lack of an obvious answer in-
vites an application of the tools of constitutional interpretation." Sager, supra note 3, at 44.
If Sager's methodology for constitutional interpretation included some appreciation of the
work of the constitutional framers and their understanding of separation of powers and fed-
eralism, his invitation to join him in applying this methodology would be more warmly re-
ceived. See infra notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
80. Brant, supra note 20, at 11.
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questions of fact."'
At the time of the Federal Convention, considerable diversity in
legal practice existed among the states, both with respect to cases
in common and civil law and particularly with respect to cases in
equity and maritime jurisdiction. Re-examination of factual issues
was permitted in some states, but was not permitted in others.
Under its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court inevitably
would be called- upon to review cases where questions of fact were
central and at issue. This prospect, however, raised the spectre of
the Supreme Court having the power to overturn a jury's findings
of fact in a criminal case. According to Brant, the problem faced
by the Convention was to draft a provision that would permit the
Court to review questions of fact in civil, equity, and maritime
cases, but that would prevent it from abusing this power by retry-
ing facts found by juries in criminal cases. Given the tremendous
diversity among the states, drafting a constitutional clause to re-
solve this problem was all but impossible. Therefore, Brant argues,
the framers took the easy way out and drafted language (albeit,
Brant concedes, poorly punctuated language) that left the whole
issue for handling by the Congress through the medium of the ex-
ceptions clause. The exceptions clause thus was "fashioned to meet
the principal criticism of the appellate jurisdiction, its inclusion of
matters of 'fact.' "82
Despite Brant's ingenuity, and that of Merry and Berger as well,
this interpretation of the exceptions clause ultimately fails. This
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the actual words and
punctuation of the Constitution. Had the framers intended what
Brant alleges they intended, they obviously were possessed of the
necessary skills to have conveyed clearly that intention. 3 Simi-
larly, Brant's interpretation cannot be squared with the proceed-
81. Id. at 5.
82. R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 307. See also Berger, supra note 14: "[IThe founders
merely intended by that clause to prevent the Court from revising the findings of a jury."
Id. at 806.
83. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833),
"[the framers] would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language." Id. at
249. For example, they could have declared: "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, but with appel-
late Jurisdiction as to Fact subject to such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make."
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ings of the Convention. What the Committee of Detail presented
to the Convention in no way suggested that Congress' power to
make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction was limited
to the treatment of factual issues. Quite the contrary, the only dis-
cussion in the Convention relating to the exceptions clause cen-
tered on whether the Court was to have power to review questions
of fact, not whether Congress' power to curtail the Court's jurisdic-
tion was limited to such questions. 4
Nor can Brant's interpretation survive exposure to the post-Con-
vention statements of Edmund Randolph and Alexander Hamil-
ton. When the exceptions clause was before the Virginia State Rat-
ifying Convention, Randolph, who had participated in .he Federal
Convention, declared that "[iut would be proper to refer here to
any thing that could be understood in the federal court. [Congress]
may except generally both as to law and fact, or they may except
as to law only, or fact only. '8 5 Alexander Hamilton also stressed
that Congress' power to make exceptions applied to law as well as
to facts: "The supreme court will possess an appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, in all the cases referred to them, but sub-
ject to any exceptions and regulations which may be thought ad-
visable."8 Hamilton remarked that the propriety of Congress'
power to except matters of law from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction "has scarcely been called into question. 8s7 "[C]lamors
have been loud," he noted, only with respect to granting the Court
any appellate jurisdiction over matters of fact. 8 In an effort to
quiet the fear of those alarmed by the prospect of any appellate
retrial of facts found by a jury, Hamilton declared, again clearly
84. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Brant likewise fails to appreciate that
all the controversy present in the state ratifying conventions concerning whether the Su-
preme Court ought even to have power to review questions of fact in its appellate jurisdic-
tion, a controversy that Brant cites as evidence supporting his general argument, is simply
not germane to the question of whether Congress has power to contract the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court with respect to substantive questions of law. For similar cita-
tion of and reliance on wholly irrelevant evidence, see Merry, supra note 20, at 59-62.
85. 3 J. ELLorr supra note 45, at 572. Randolph was echoing John Marshall's comments
from the previous day: "What is the meaning of the term exceptions? Does it not mean an
alteration and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate ju-
risdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme Court." Id. at 560.
86. THE FEDERALIST, No. 81, at 552 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
87. Id. at 549-50.
88. Id. at 550.
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contrary to Brant's contention, that "the Supreme Court shall pos-
sess appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, and that this
jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regulation as
the national legislature may prescribe."89 All of this merely reaf-
firms Hamilton's assurance that if any "inconveniences" should
arise from the powers the Constitution grants to the federal judici-
ary, Congress will have authority to make such exceptions and to
prescribe such regulations as it believes necessary "to obviate or
remove these inconveniences."90
Finally, Brant's interpretation is fundamentally at odds with an
unwavering line of judicial opinion beginning with Chief Justice
Ellsworth, himself a delegate to the Federal Convention and a
member of the Committee of Detail, and extending to the
present.91
B. Reliance on Ex Parte McCardle
A second major argument against Congress' claim to plenary
power under article III, section 2 centers on the meaning of Ex
89. Id. at 552. Hamilton also observed that separating law and fact in certain issues was
impossible. Id. at 551.
90. THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 541 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Although Brant
quotes from THE FEDERALIST No. 80, he engages in a form of academic gerrymandering and
conveniently overlooks this passage. See Brant, supra note 20, at 9. Brant focuses his atten-
tion instead on a passage from THE FEDEA LIST No. 81:
To avoid all inconveniences, it will be safest to declare generally that the Su-
preme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, and
that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as the
national legislature shall prescribe. This will enable the government to modify
it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.
Id., No. 81, at 552. See also Merry, supra note 20, at 309 (also ignoring TmE FEDERALIsT No.
80). This passage, of course, is irrelevant to the issue of whether Congress' power under the
exceptions clause is limited simply to curtailing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in cases raising questions of fact. To prove that Congress' power extends to regulating
the treatment of facts does not prove that its power is limited to such regulation. See supra
note 84.
Despite all of this evidence, Sager maintains the following position:
[Ilf the Framers of Article III had had the bad sense to believe the control of
jurisdiction was a workable way to give Congress a substantive check on the
federal judiciary, we might well have to live with that fact and with its implica-
tions for the constitutional shortcuts that Congress would be entitled to take.
But there is no evidence that they held this belief ....
Sager, supra note 3, at 42.
91. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
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Parte McCardle. 2 Rather than supporting Congress' claim as is
commonly maintained, several scholars contend that McCardle
concedes nothing to Congress."3 They note that in McCardle, the
Court carefully pointed out that the repealing act of 18681" did not
affect judicial authority to issue writs of habeas corpus under sec-
tion 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repeal-
ing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court,
in cases of habeas corpus is denied. But this is an error. The
[repealing] act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction
any cases but appeals from the Circuit Courts under the act of
1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously
exercised.9 5
These scholars further note that this statement was reaffirmed
a few months later in Ex Parte Yerger.96 In Yerger, on a petition
for habeas corpus, the Court reviewed a circuit court decision de-
nying the writ to a civilian awaiting trial by a military commission
for violating the Reconstruction Acts. Without the slightest hesita-
tion, the Supreme Court unanimously sustained its jurisdiction
and held that the repealing act of 1868 did not affect its authority
under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue the writ.17 Thus, these
scholars argue, McCardle does not sanction congressional impair-
ment of the Court's jurisdiction:
The [repealing] statute did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction
to decide McCardle's case; he could still petition the Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of
his confinement. The legislation did no more than eliminate one
procedure for Supreme Court review of decisions denying habeas
corpus relief while leaving another equally efficacious one
92. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
93. See R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 2-3; Hart, supra note 20, at 1365; Ratner, supra note
20, at 178-81. See also Rotunda, supra note 3, at 849-51.
94. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided all fed-
eral judges with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
14, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
95. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
96. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
97. Id. at 96-98.
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available.9 8
These scholars also look to United States v. Klein,99 decided two
years after Yerger, in which the Court held that Congress could
not enact legislation to eliminate an area of jurisdiction in order to
control the results in a particular case. Klein sued in the Court of
Claims under an 1863 statute that allowed the recovery of land
captured or abandoned during the Civil War if the claimant could
prove he had not assisted in the rebellion. 100 Relying on an earlier
Supreme Court decision 011 that a presidential pardon proved con-
clusively that the recipient of the pardon had not aided the rebel-
lion, Klein prevailed in the Court of Claims. While the govern-
ment's appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, Congress passed
a statute providing that a presidential pardon would not support a
claim for captured property, and that acceptance of a pardon for
participation in the rebellion, without a disclaimer of the facts re-
cited, was conclusive evidence that the claimant had aided the en-
emy.102 Furthermore, the statute provided that on proof of such
pardon and acceptance, which could be heard summarily, the juris-
diction of the federal judiciary in the case should cease, and the
Court of Claims should forthwith dismiss the suit of such claim-
ant.1 0 3 As Chief Justice Chase remarked: "The substance of this
enactment is that an acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer,
shall be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but shall be null
and void as evidence of the rights conferred by it both in the Court
of Claims and in this court on appeal."10' 4 The Supreme Court held
the act to be unconstitutional because it subverted the judicial
process by prescribing "a rule for the decision of a cause in a par-
ticular way,'"1 5 and it also infringed upon the constitutional power
98. Ratner, supra note 20, at 180.
99. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
100. Id. at 131. The statute at issue was the Act of Mar. 12, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820.
101. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
102. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
103. Id.
104. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144.
105. Id. at 146. The Court continued:
Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction
of the judgments of the Court of Claims on appeal. Can it prescribe a rule in
conformity with which the Court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus con-
ferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law,
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of the executive by impairing the effect of a pardon."'e
These efforts to construe McCardle narrowly and to employ Yer-
ger and Klein to protect the spirit of judicial review from the letter
of article III, section 2, however, are unsuccessful. Neither McCar-
dle nor Yerger in any way suggests that the Court would have been
justified in invalidating the act of 1868 if the act had excepted
from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction cases arising
under section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Quite the contrary,
as Chief Justice Chase noted in McCardle, judicial duty entails the
refusal to exercise ungranted jurisdiction as well as the obligation
to exercise jurisdiction when it is conferred by the Constitution or
by law.107 McCardle and Yerger are wholly faithful to Justice
Chase's understanding. In McCardle, the Court declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction that had been positively excepted by the repealing
act of 1868. In Yerger, the Court firmly exercised jurisdiction that
the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred and which the repealing act in
no way limited. Thus, the Court on both occasions acted consist-
ently with Chief Justice Marshall's observation in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia:10 s "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This question
seems to us to answer itself.
Id. at 147.
106. Id. at 147-48.
To the executive alone is entrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted
without limit. Pardon includes amnesty. It blots out the offense pardoned and
removes all its penal consequences. It may be granted on conditions. In these
particular pardons, that no doubt might exist as to their character, restoration
of property was expressly pledged, and the pardon was granted on condition
that the person who availed himself of it should take and keep a prescribed
oath.
Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon
any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the
provision under consideration. The court is required to receive special pardons
as evidence of guilt and to treat them as null and void. It is required to disre-
gard pardons granted by proclamation on condition, though the condition has
been fulfilled, and to deny them their legal effect. This certainly impairs the
executive authority, and directs the court to be instrumental to that end.
Id.
107. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
108. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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or the other would be treason to the constitution. '0 9
Similarly, reliance on Klein is misplaced. Klein involved a con-
gressional attempt to forbid the Court from giving the effect to evi-
dence which, in the Court's judgment, such evidence should have,
and directed the Court to give the evidence an effect precisely con-
trary.110 In Klein, Congress sought to curtail the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court to obtain a particular result in a specific
case; by so doing, Congress "inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power." ' Congress' ac-
tion in Klein is altogether different from congressional contrac-
tions of the Court's jurisdiction that seek merely to shift the deter-
mination of any result, whatever that result might be, to the lower
federal or state courts, both of which are also bound by the Consti-
tution as the supreme law of the land. 2 Shifting jurisdiction to
lower federal or state courts is wholly permissible, and the Court in
Klein declared as much, acknowledging that "if this Act did noth-
ing more... [than] simply deny the right of appeal in a particular
class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as
an exercise of the power of Congress to make 'such exceptions from
the appellate jurisdiction' as should seem to it expedient." 13
C. The Contraction of Congress' Power Due to the Passage of
Time
A third argument against the letter of article III operates from
the perspective of what Justice Rehnquist has called the "living
Constitution with a vengeance."'" This argument is based on the
premise that congressional "control over the Court's appellate ju-
risdiction has in effect now been repealed by the passage of time
and by the recognition that exercise of such power would be in the
109. Id. at 404.
110. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. See also Vaughn, Congressional Power to Eliminate Bus-
ing in School Desegregation Cases, 31 ARK. L. REv. 231, 244 (1977).
111. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
112. This Article in no way condones Congress' use of power to determine the outcome of
any particular judicial proceeding. As James Madison recognized, such a power would
clearly make the legislators "advocates and parties to the causes which they determine."
THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
113. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. See also Rice, supra note 70, at 193-94.
114. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TExAs L. REv. 693, 695 (1976).
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truest sense subversive of the American tradition of an indepen-
dent judiciary. 1 115 C. Herman Pritchett, who is closely identified
with this position, argues that while the language of article III, sec-
tion 2 may have seemed reasonable in 1787, so, too, did choosing a
President by indirect election."1 " Originally, the Supreme Court
was just a few words in an unadopted document; today, however, it
is the most respected judicial body in the world and has the au-
thority to determine the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 17
Given these changes in conditions, "Congress can no longer claim
with good conscience the authority granted by article III, section
2.,,228
The assertion that new conditions can amend the clear language
and intent of the exceptions clause is subject to considerable
doubt. Changing circumstances"' and the passage of time may be
considered in the interpretation and adaptation of such broadly
phrased constitutional provisions as the due process and commerce
clauses. These clauses were drafted expansively to allow evolving
interpretations as time might require. Neither the language of the
exceptions clause nor the debates of the Convention, however, in-
dicate that the framers intended such broad adaptations of article
III. Changing circumstances can neither alter nor amend the mean-
ing of clear and unequivocal language in the Constitution. 120 Even
115. C. PRrrcHE-r, supra note 20, at 122. See also C. PRITCHETr, THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUmoN 35-36 (3d ed. 1977); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 501-13 (1974).
116. C. PRITCHEr, supra note 20, at 122.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 504.
120. See Redish & Woods, supra note 3:
The seventh amendment, for example, provides that in all cases where the
"value in controversy" exceeds twenty dollars, the right to a jury trial at com-
mon law must be preserved. It might be argued that use of a twenty dollar
floor does not today accomplish the framers' goal of precluding a jury trial in
minor civil cases, for twenty dollars at the time of the drafting of the seventh
amendment meant something quite different from twenty dollars today. But
despite such an argument, we could not read an inflationary spiral into the
terms of the seventh amendment. The seventh amendment is strict and un-
bending in its dictates on this matter. If we are to alter it, even in order to
accomplish the framers' goal, we must do so through the amendment process.
Similarly, the language and history of article IlI are so clear that any altera-
tion, even to accomplish the framers' purposes, must come by amendment and
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Pritchett recognizes this, at least with respect to the other consti-
tutional feature he regards as anachronistic-indirect election of
the President. Thus, rather than contending that the Electoral
College has been repealed by history, Pritchett served on and sup-
ported the policies of an American Bar Association blue ribbon
commission that proposed a constitutional amendment formally
abolishing the Electoral College and substituting in its place direct
election of the President. 121
Many provisions of the Constitution, of course, are phrased
broadly, thus permitting flexible interpretations that adapt the
document to changing circumstances. Nonetheless, even when such
broad phrasing exists, the goal must be "adaptation within the
Constitution rather than adaptation of the Constitution.112 2 The
terms of article III, however, are not phrased so broadly and no
doubt exists as to the framers' intent. Unless the Court is to be
permitted to disregard the outer rational limits of constitutional
language-all to protect its role as principal interpretor of that
language-the "passage of time theory" cannot be legitimately em-
ployed to amend the letter of the exceptions clause.
D. The "Essential Functions" Argument
A fourth argument against Congress' power to curtail the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is that Congress cannot con-
stitutionally make any exceptions that will destroy what is vari-
ously described as the Court's essential role or function. 123 "[T]he
[exceptions] clause means 'With such exceptions and under such
regulations as Congress may make, not inconsistent with the essen-
tial function of the Supreme Court under this Constitution.' ",124
not by interpretation in light of "changing circumstances."
Id. at 74.
121. See N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT 161 (1968).
122. Wolfe, supra note 71, at 301.
123. See, e.g., INORITY REPORT, supra note 33, at 156; Brant, supra note 19, at 24; Brest,
The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretatiori, 27 STAN. L. RE..
585, 594 (1975); Hart, supra note 19, at 1365; Ratner, supra note 19, at 160-61; Rotunda,
supra note 3, at 845; Sager, supra note 3, at 42-68; White, Reflections on the Role of the
Supreme Court: The Contemporary Debate and the "Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE
162, 170 (1979).
124. Ratner, supra note 19, at 172. Interestingly, those who make this argument point out
that none of the cases cited in support of Congress' powers under the exceptions clause,
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This argument, however, is also fraught with difficulties. It makes
the Court itself the final arbiter of the extent of its powers. The
argument contends not only that the essential functions of the
Court cannot be limited, but also that the Court exclusively, and
not the Congress, is to determine what functions are, in fact, essen-
tial. This interpretation of the exceptions clause cannot be
sustained:
It is hardly in keeping with the spirit of checks and balances to
read such a virtually unlimited power into the Constitution. If
the Framers intended so to permit the Supreme Court to define
its own jurisdiction even against the will of Congress, it is fair to
say that they would have made that intention explicit.125
Nothing in the text of the exceptions clause or in any Supreme
Court opinion addressing this subject suggests that Congress'
power under article III, section 2 is limited to making "'inessen-
tial' exceptions. ' 126 The distinction between the "essential" and
"inessential" functions of the Court is, of course, wholly extracon-
stitutional. Consequently, those who draw this distinction on the
Court's behalf are not limited by the letter of the Constitution but,
rather, are free to define the Court and its essential role and func-
tions as they see fit. Not surprisingly, given the absence of any
constitutional restrictions (or, more precisely, given their refusal to
recognize and abide by any constitutional restrictions), proponents
of this interpretation advance and defend a wide variety of defini-
tions. Thus, Henry Hart, who first propounded this argument, de-
fines the essential role of the Supreme Court as serving as a check
on the coordinate branches of government to keep them from de-
stroying the Constitution.127 Leonard Ratner offers a slightly dif-
including McCardle, involves what they would consider an "essential function" of the Su-
preme Court. Id. at 173-81. This fact, however, may attest more to the sense of sound con-
gressional opinion against the wisdom of making such exceptions than to any notion that
Congress lacks the power to do so. See Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 257.
125. Rice, supra note 70, at 195. For a further discussion of the exceptions clause and its
relation to separation of powers and checks and balances, see infra notes 140-54 and accom-
panying text.
126. Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 257.
127. Hart, supra note 20, at 1365. See also Brant, supra note 20, in which Brant argues
that the Court's critical function is to prevent "the destruction or infringement of any of the
mandatory requirements of the Constitution." Id. at 24.
Hart and Brant appear to believe that only the Supreme Court, through its employment
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ferent view, stressing the Court's "essential constitutional func-
tions of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal
law." 12 8 In contrast, Archibald Cox asserts that the "chief function
of the Supreme Court is to protect human rights." 129 Even more
expansively, Paul Brest accords a special role for the Court in pro-
moting "individual rights and decision making through democratic
processes."130'
Although considerable variety exists among these definitions of
the Court and its essential role, they share one common element.
Central to all formulations of this argument is an activist view of
the judiciary. Only through frequent recourse to judicial review
will the Court be able to perform the essential functions judicial
activists assign to it. Quite naturally, proponents of the essential
functions argument see Congress' plenary powers under article III,
section 2 as a threat to judicial activism.131 These proponents,
therefore, strive to distort or obscure the letter of the exceptions
clause, thereby rendering secure the spirit of judicial review that
animates their judicial activism.132
of judicial review, is able to provide protection against the Constitution's destruction. This
view ignores the operation of such constitutional mechanisms as separation of powers, bi-
cameralism, staggered elections, federalism, and the multiplicity of interests present in an
extended republic. See R. RossuM & G. MCDOWELL, THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: POLITICS,
STATESMANSHIP, AND THE CONSTITUTION 6-11 (1981). See also infra notes 140-61 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, even if these other constitutional features were absent, Hart's and
Brant's reliance on the judiciary still would be misplaced. As Learned Hand observed:
[Tihis much I think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of mod-
eration is gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no
court need save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting
upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.
L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LMERTY 125 (1959).
128. Ratner, supra note 20, at 201. See also Sager, supra note 3, at 43, 45.
129. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 199,
253 (1971). See also White, supra note 118. White insists that the Court's chief role is serv-
ing "as the principal elite institution protecting the people's rights." Id. at 170. White goes
so far as to argue that the Court should "acknowledge that the source of newly invented
rights is not the Constitution but the enhanced seriousness of certain values in our society."
Id. at 168.
130. Brest, supra note 123, at 594. See also J. CHOPER, supra note 19; Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 226 (1980); Ely, supra
note 16, at 87.
131. See Brant, supra note 20, at 27-28.
132. See Van Alstyne, supra note 32:
It does appear to be more than a passing strange argument to suggest that
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The incompatibility that proponents of the essential functions
argument perceive between the letter of article III and the spirit of
judicial review is almost exclusively attributable to the way in
which they have defined the essential role and function of the Su-
preme Court. Their expansive view of what the Court should do
obviously is threatened by language that gives to Congress the
power to except from the Court's appellate jurisdiction the cases
necessary to sustain the Court's activist role."'3 This perceived in-
compatability, however, can be avoided entirely if the Court's es-
sential role is defined more modestly:
Federal Courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on
constitutional questions because there is a special function
vested in them to enforce the Constitution or police the other
agencies of government. They do so rather for the reason that
they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their
jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect to the supreme law
of the land. s13
This more limited conception of the role of the Court is consistent
not only with the actual provisions of the Constitution, but also
with Hamilton's original defense of judicial review in The Federal-
ist, No. 78 13 and Chief Justice Marshall's establishment of judicial
because the full evolution of substantive constitutional review may itself have
been exogenous to the Constitution, the power of Congress to make exceptions
of any appellate jurisdiction described in article III therefore does not extend
to such review; as though the power to make exceptions applies to any appel-
late jurisdiction granted by article III, but not to that judicial power which the
Supreme Court simply evolved in the fullness of time.
Id. at 262-63.
133. Their expansive view of the Court's essential role also is threatened by, and in turn
threatens, other express constitutional provisions, including the prescribed means for
amending the Constitution found in art. V, the delegations of power to Congress found in
art. I, § 8, and the enforcement sections of the post-Civil War amendments.
134. Wechsler, supra note 14, at 1006. "It is not that the judges are appointed arbiters,
and to determine as it were upon application, whether the Assembly have or have not vio-
lated the Constitution; but when an action is necessarily brought in judgment before them,
they must, unavoidably, determine one way or another." Letter from James Iredell to Rich-
ard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 82-83. See also Rice,
supra note 70: "Whatever the cogency of [the] 'essential role' test would be to a wholesale
withdrawal of jurisdiction, if it were ever attempted by Congress, [this] test cannot properly
be applied to narrowly drawn withdrawals of jurisdiction over particular types of cases." Id.
at 195.
135. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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review in Marbury v. Madison.3 6 Moreover, because this interpre-
tation regards the Court's power of judicial review as extending no
further than to cases otherwise within its jurisdiction, which juris-
diction is subject to such exceptions as Congress shall make, this
interpretation reflects the compatibility of the letter of article III
and the spirit of judicial review.13 7
E. The Separation of Powers/Federalism Argument
A fifth contention closely related to the essential functions argu-
ment is that Congress' power under the exceptions clause is limited
by the constitutional principles of separation of powers and
federalism. 38
If Congress also has plenary control over the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, then... Congress [could] by statute
profoundly alter this structure of American government. It
[could] all but destroy the coordinate judicial branch and thus
upset the delicately poised constitutional system of checks and
balances. It [could] distort the nature of the federal union by
permitting each state to decide for itself the scope of its author-
ity under the Constitution. It [could] reduce the supreme law of
the land as defined in article VI to a hodgepodge of inconsistent
decisions by making fifty state courts and eleven federal courts
of appeal the final judges of the meaning and application of the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.""
136. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
137. See Chief Justice Chase's comment in Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 515
(1868), supra text accompanying note 59. See also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911):
The exercise of [judicial review], the most important and delicate duty of this
court, is not given to it as a body with revisory power over the action of Con-
gress, but because the rights of litigants in justiciable controversies require the
court to choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be en-
acted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the power of the legis-
lative branch of the government.
Id. at 361.
138. Sager describes the separation of powers/federalism argument as a "particular ver-
sion of the essential function claim." According to this version, the Constitution "contem-
plates federal judicial supervision of state conduct to ensure state compliance with federal
constitutional norms." Sager, supra note 3, at 43, 45.
139. Ratner, supra note 20, at 157-58. See also Hearings, supra note 10, at 14 (statement
of Leonard G. Ratner).
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This contention, too, is flawed, because it rests on a superficial un-
derstanding of the political principles of the Constitution.
Those who would limit Congress' power under article III, section
2 stress that use of the exceptions clause constitutes an attack on
the status and independence of the Court and thereby jeopardizes
the principle of separation of powers. 140 These criticisms are
groundless. In our constitutional system, the judiciary is not sup-
posed to be entirely independent; neither is the legislative nor ex-
ecutive branch. Separation of powers does not entail complete in-
dependence. The framers did not intend the branches of
government to be wholly unconnected with each other;141 rather,
the framers sought to create a government in which the branches
would be so connected and blended, as to give to each a constitu-
tional control over the others.142 The framers accomplished this
blending "by so contriving the interior structure of the government
• . . that its several constituent parts, . . . [are] by their mutual
relations, the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.' 43 The result is a government consisting of three coordi-
nate and equal branches, each performing a blend of functions,
thereby balancing, as opposed to merely separating, powers. 144
The term separation of powers is, in fact, a misnomer. The fram-
ers created not so much a government of separated powers as one
of "separated institutions sharing powers." 45 This sharing of pow-
ers allows the branches to have a "mutual influence and operation
on one another. Each part acts and is acted upon, supports and is
supported, regulates and is regulated by the rest.' 148 Thus, the
three branches, including the judiciary, are intended to move "in a
140. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 10, at 226-34 (testimony of Edward I. Cutler); C.
PRITCHETT, supra note 20, at 15; Brant, supra note 20, at 28-29; Ratner, supra note 20, at
158.
141. THE FEDERALIST, No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
142. Id.
143. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 347-48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
144. As James Wilson declared in the Federal Convention: "The separation of the depart-
ments does not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act
separately though on the same objects." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 36, at 78. See also R.
RossuM & G. McDOWELL, supra note 127, at 6-11; R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRESIDENCY 2-7 (1971).
145. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960).
146. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 300 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
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line of direction somewhat different from that, which each acting
by itself, would have taken; but, at the same time, in a line partak-
ing the natural direction of each, and formed out of the natural
direction of the whole-the true line of public liberty and
happiness. "147
The framers recognized that power is, by nature, encroaching,
whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial.148 They solved the
problem of "the encroaching spirit of power" 149 by balancing the
powers assigned to each of the three branches so that each branch
could effectively check, but not control, the other two. Further-
more, the framers did not give any one branch the authority to
decide whether its powers encroached on the others: "[N]one of
[the three branches], it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or
superior right of settling the boundaries between their respected
powers.) 150
The framers did not consider the judiciary exempt from the op-
eration of these principles, although they did consider the judiciary
to be the least dangerous of the three branches because they had
given the judiciary the least amount of power.
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of
power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are
separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in its capacity
to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the
honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature
not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which
the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth
of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither force nor will but merely judg-
ment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.151
147. Id.
148. THE FEDERALIST, No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
149. Id. at 333.
150. THE FEDERALIST, No. 49, at 339 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
151. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Although the framers regarded the judiciary as having the least
capacity, because of the very nature of its functions, to be danger-
ous, the framers recognized that judicial power could be arbitrary
and oppressive. The framers expected that the arbitrary discretion
of the courts could be "bound down by strict rules and precedents
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them. '152 Additionally, the framers pro-
vided the other branches with powers to check judicial encroach-
ments. Thus, the framers provided for congressional appropriation
of money for the judicial branch, presidential appointment and
senatorial confirmation of judges, and congressional power to de-
fine entirely the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. The
framers also provided for the impeachment of judges by the House
of Representatives and the trial of impeached judges by the Sen-
ate-what The Federalist called "a complete security" against
"the danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative author-
ity.'' 53 Finally, the framers of the Constitution provided the legis-
lative branch with ample authority under article III, section 2, so
that if "some partial inconveniences" were to arise as a result of
the judicial branch's exercise of its powers, Congress could make
such exceptions and prescribe such regulations "as will be calcu-
lated to obviate or remove these inconveniences.' 54
Thus, the framers never intended for judicial power to be abso-
lute or for the judiciary to be completely independent. Just as they
provided checks upon the legislative and executive branches, so too
the framers included mechanisms to restrain the judiciary. The ex-
ceptions clause was one such mechanism.
Those who contend that Congress' power under the exceptions
clause is limited by the constitutional principle of federalism be-
tray an equally superficial understanding of the political principles
of the Constitution. They contend, with Leonard Sager, that Con-
gress cannot restrict Supreme Court supervision of state conduct if
such supervision is necessary to insure uniform judicial interpreta-
tion and state compliance with federal constitutional norms.1
55 If
152. Id. at 529. See also THE FEDERALIST, No. 48, at 334 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
153. THE FEDERALIST, No. 81, at 545-46 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 541 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
155. Sager, supra note 3, at 43. See also Kay, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The
Unforeseen Impact on Courts and Congress, 65 JUDICATURE 188 (1981); Ratner, supra note
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the Supreme Court were restricted by Congress in such a manner,
such restriction would, they fear, reduce the supremacy clause to a
virtual nullity. Sager goes so far as to argue that if the states were
not answerable to the Supreme Court, the Constitution would have
"little to recommend it over the Articles of Confederation."' 56 This
view is deficient in a number of particulars.
This view reflects a common misperception concerning the na-
ture of American federalism. The framers relied on federalism, as
they also relied on separation of powers and the multiplicity of in-
terests in an extended republic, to achieve their constitutional
objectives-the creation and operation of an efficient and powerful
guarantor of rights and liberties organized around the principle of
qualitative majority rule.157 The framers sought a "Republican
remedy for the disease most incident to the Republican Govern-
ment."'158 That disease was the tension between majority tyranny
and democratic ineptitude. 59 The framers saw the federalism they
were creating as contributing to that Republican remedy. Their
federalism, however, was not merely a division of power between
the national government and the state governments; it was also a
blending of federal elements into the structure and procedures of
the central government itself. 60 An obvious example of this blend-
ing is the mixture into the Senate of the federal principle of equal
representation of all the states."6 ' The framers recognized that this
20, at 158-61.
156. Sager, supra note 3, at 48.
157. The principle of qualitative majority rule considers not only the degree of support
that a policy receives, but also the quality of the policy itself. See generally R. RossuM & G.
TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES AND INTERPRETATION (1983).
158. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 65 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
159. The rival defects of majority tyranny and democratic ineptitude posed seemingly
unsurmountable obstacles for constitution-makers, for the more they attempted to overcome
majority tyranny by withholding the power to tyrannize, the more they rendered the govern-
ment inept and powerless, and vice versa.
160. See Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism, 86 YALE L.J. 1273, 1278-85 (1977).
161. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 22 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In this essay, Hamil-
ton discussed federalism as it was understood until the time of the Federal Convention and
described it as characterized by three operative principles:
1. The authority of the central federal government was restricted to the individual
state governments and did not reach the individual citizens composing the states. Even this
authority, however, was limited; the resolutions of the federal authority amounted to little
more than mere recommendations, which the states opted to observe or disregard.
2. The central federal government had no authority over the internal problems of the
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principle, when joined with bicameralism and separation of powers,
could contribute directly to qualitative majority rule. For a mea-
sure to become law, for example a measure controlling the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it would have to pass the
Senate where, because of the federal principle of equal representa-
tion, the presence of a nationally distributed majority and the
moderating tendencies associated therewith would be guaranteed.
To the framers, federalism also meant that the same relationship
that existed between the citizen and the individual state also
would exist, at least with regard to those functions specified in ar-
ticle I, section 8, between the citizen and the centralized national
government. This is a crucial difference between the Constitution
and the Articles of Confederation, and one which Professor Sager
apparently overlooks. 162 Under the Constitution, the national gov-
ernment need not gain the cooperation of a state to regulate the
behavior of the state's citizens, for they are also citizens of the
United States. In fact, even if a state actively attempted to frus-
trate the wishes of the national government, the national govern-
ment, through either legislative or judicial action, could reach the
citizenry and hold them personally accountable for their actions.
This is a significant difference between the Constitution and the
Articles of Confederation: the national government can govern the
individual directly and need not rely on the good will or coopera-
tion of state intermediaries.
Similarly, if the Congress, moderated in its judgments by the na-
tionally distributed majorities that are assured by the federal prin-
ciple of equal representation of all states in the Senate, restricts
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a certain subject
matter area because Congress has concluded that the Court's deci-
sions in that area have unduly limited the states, Congress' action
can hardly be described as placing the supremacy clause in jeop-
ardy. Rather, Congress is simply exercising its power under the ex-
ceptions clause to obviate those inconveniences that have arisen as
a result of the judiciary's interventions and, in a manner that is
individual states. Its rule was limited primarily to certain external tasks of mutual interest
to the member states.
3. Each individual member had an exact equality of suffrage. This equal vote was de-
rived from the equality of sovereignty possessed by each member state.
162. See generally Sager, supra note 3, at 45-57.
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wholly consistent with the constitutional principle of separation of
powers, is determining for the national government what the states
may or may not do.
The view that the Congress can limit the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court without jeopardizing federalism is compati-
ble not only with the framers' understanding but also with the ac-
tions taken by both Congress and the federal judiciary until well
into the twentieth century. Thus, in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress did not provide for Supreme Court review of cases in
which state courts invalidated state conduct on federal grounds,
even if those cases invalidated state conduct under an overly broad
reading of federal laws that in turn defeated other federal rights.1 13
In the same Act, Congress also subjected Supreme Court review of
civil cases to a jurisdictional amount,"" a requirement that was not
eliminated for all cases involving constitutional issues until 1891165
and was not abolished with respect to Supreme Court review of all
federal questions until 1925.16 Congress did not provide for Su-
preme Court review of federal criminal cases until 1802, and then
only for review of decisions in which an inferior federal court had
divided on a question of law.1 67 Congress did not grant general
power to the Court to review major federal criminal cases until
1891.1"68 Obviously, the opponents of Congress' exercise of its pow-
ers under the exceptions clause have placed a premium on the uni-
formity of constitutional interpretation and Supreme Court super-
vision of state conduct that has not been shared by either Congress
or the Court.
F. Limits on Congressional Power: The Bitl of Rights and Other
Constitutional Provisions
A sixth argument made against Congress' power under the ex-
ceptions clause is that this power is limited by the constitutional
requirements of article I, section 9 and the Bill of Rights and is
163. Congress did not authorize the Supreme Court to review cases that invalidated state
conduct on federal grounds until 1914. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
164. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84.
165. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28.
166. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 240(a), 43 Stat. 936, 938-39.
167. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159-61.
168. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827.
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fully subject to review under these and any other constitutional
provisions uniformly applicable to all acts of Congress." 9 Those
who make this argument draw a parallel between Congress' ple-
nary power under the commerce clause and its plenary power
under article III, section 2. For example, just as Congress' power to
regulate commerce among the several states is subject to the re-
quirements of the first and fifth amendments, 1 0 so also is Con-
gress' power to make exceptions. The due process clause of the
fifth amendment plays an especially prominent role in this argu-
ment. Advocates of this argument view the fifth amendment as
guaranteeing litigants an independent judicial hearing of all consti-
tutional claims, thereby limiting Congress' power to make excep-
tions that will deprive litigants of this hearing and, hence, of the
opportunity to petition for the remedies they seek.
Like the other arguments against Congress' power to make ex-
ceptions, this argument also is deficient. Those who make this ar-
gument are correct, of course, in pointing out that the congres-
sional power at issue is subject to the due process clause and all
other constitutional provisions uniformly applicable to acts of Con-
gress. What they fail to consider, however, is that the independent
judicial hearing they insist upon need not occur at the Supreme
Court level. The requirements of the due process clause can be sat-
isfied fully in the state and lower federal courts, even if Congress
were to strip the Supreme Court of its entire appellate jurisdiction.
Moreover, because the Supreme Court noted in Cary v. Curtis1 1
that "the judicial power of the United States . .. is .. .depen-
dent for its distribution . . . entirely upon the action of Congress,
who possess the sole power . ..of investing [the inferior courts]
with jurisdiction .. .in the exact degree and character which to
Congress may seem proper for the public good, ' 17 2 it would be con-
stitutionally permissible under the due process clause for Congress
169. See L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 (1978); Hart, supra note 20, at
1373; Van Alstyne, supra note 70, at 263-64.
170. Since National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), it appears that Con-
gress' power under the commerce clause is also subject to the dictates of the tenth
amendment.
171. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
172. Id. at 245. See also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441 (1850); Vaughn, supra note 110, at 237-41.
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to deny jurisdiction as well to all lower federal courts, provided
that state courts retained jurisdiction to hear these matters." 3
State courts, after all, are bound by the Constitution as the su-
preme law of the land.17 4 Moreover, "[iun the scheme of the Consti-
tution, [state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional
rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones."1 7 5 Thus,
apparently nothing less than the total denial of any state judicial
form would be subject to successful challenge as a violation of pro-
cedural due process. 78
G. The Prohibition on Unconstitutionally Motivated Withdraw-
als of Jurisdiction
Finally, a seventh argument against Congress' use of the excep-
tions clause to curtail the Court's appellate jurisdiction is that con-
gressional actions in this regard cannot be unconstitutionally
motivated:
When Congress manipulates jurisdiction in an effort to deny
recognition and judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, it
has deliberately set itself against the Constitution as the Court
understands that document. Comparable behavior on the part of
a mayor or police chief would constitute "bad faith," and so
here. Legislative bad faith is a constitutionally impermissible
173. See Berger, supra note 14, at 804; Wechsler, supra note 13, at 1005. See also Redish
& Woods, supra note 3. Redish and Woods argue that Congress' power to deny original
jurisdiction to the federal courts and to vest it instead in the state courts is limited by
Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), in which the Supreme Court overturned a
habeas corpus order by a Wisconsin state court to a federal official ordering the release of an
allegedly under-age soldier from the United States Army. The Court reasoned that a state
court had no power to interfere with the operations of federal officials. Redish and Woods
infer from Tarble's Case that state courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any case that seeks
to direct the conduct of federal officials through the use not only of habeas corpus but also
of mandamus and injunctive powers. They later admit, however, that "Congress can proba-
bly circumvent the difficulties created by Tarble's Case by explicitly authorizing state court
jurisdiction over the acts of federal officials." Redish & Woods, supra note 3, at 106. Thus, if
Congress wants to preclude all lower federal court jurisdiction, it can do so without raising
questions of due process, provided only it clearly authorizes state court review of those
cases. See Sager, supra note 3, at 80-84.
174. See Wechsler, supra note 14, at 1005.
175. Hart, supra note 20, at 1401. See also Kay, supra note 148, at 186; Taylor, Limiting
Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Unconstitutionality of Current Legislative Proposals, 65
JUDICATURE 199, 201 (1981).
176. Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 269.
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motive, and it offers an independent ground for doubting the
constitutionality of jurisdictional legislation.177
The claim that congressional use of the exceptions clause to dis-
place a disfavored judicial precedent is unconstitutional can be
sustained only by embracing the view that the Constitution is
merely what the Court says it is. Sager embraces this view,' 7s and
he fears that "[i]f Congress enacts a selective jurisdictional limita-
tion for cases that concern state conduct, it will be issuing an open,
unambiguous invitation to state and local officials to engage in con-
duct that the Supreme Court has explicitly held unconstitu-
tional.' 1 79 Appalled by the prospect of such a strategem, he repeat-
edly labels it as "tawdry" and "lewd"18s0 and as seducing the state
judiciary to "malfeasance."' 81
This willingness to treat the Constitution as identical with its
judicial gloss, however, is problematic. The mere reference to such
notorious cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford,8 2 Plessy v. Ferguson,'8
and Lochner v. New York18 4 is sufficient to highlight the difficulty.
If the Court was correct in its interpretations of the Constitution
in these cases, then efforts to overturn these decisions by constitu-
tional amendment, remedial legislation, or subsequent litigation
were unconstitutionally motivated. If, however, the Court was mis-
taken in its interpretations of the Constitution in these cases, then
the Constitution is not simply what the Court says it is, and some
constitutional means must be available by which to rectify judicial
errors.'85 Without such a means, the fate described by Abraham
177. Sager, supra note 3, at 76-77. Sager also writes: "Harm to constitutionally protected
interests occurs whenever controversial rights are singled out for exclusion from federal ju-
risdiction. Where the specific circumstances surrounding Congress' deliberations conspire to
send an apparent message of Congressional disapproval of federal judicial doctrine, the
harm is exaggerated." Id. at 75. See also Brest, supra note 123, at 589-94; Taylor, supra
note 175, at 202-04.
178. See Sager, supra note 3, at 41, 68-69, 72-73, 80, 87.
179. Id. at 69.
180. Id. at 41, 74, 89.
181. Id. at 80. On other occasions, Sager describes the -seduction as "bullying." Id. at 26,
64.
182. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
183. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
184. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
185. Ironically, whereas Sager and his like-minded colleagues generally argue that the
Constitution is what the Court says it is, they implicitly insist on one exception to this rule:
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Lincoln in his First Inaugural Address cannot be avoided:
If the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting
the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation
between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased
to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
the government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.186
Actually, various constitutional means do exist to correct Court
misinterpretations; the exceptions clause is but one means of
correction.
IV. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF
JURISDICTION
At this juncture, it should be apparent that the various argu-
ments advanced against the exceptions clause are inadequate to
accomplish the formidable task of displacing the clear and express
words of article III, section 2. Although they are ingeniously cast
and earnestly argued, these arguments can be rebutted, and Con-
gress' power to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion remains plenary. This conclusion, however, is unacceptable to
some constitutional scholars. Irving Brant may be more graphic
than most, but he is no more alarmed than many when he writes:
"The mind is staggered by the thought of what would result if
Congress should pass, and the Supreme Court should bow to, a law
prohibiting the review of state court decisions, or cases involving
the first or fourteenth amendments.1187 For Brant, the exceptions
clause has "become a dagger sharpened by social conflict and
pointed at the heart of the Bill of Rights. Time and again Congress
has raised this dagger. Only once has it descended, but the menace
continues to mount."188 These misgivings, however, are unfounded,
the Constitution, or at least art. m, § 2, is not what the Court says it is, at least in Ex Parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 505 (1868).
186. 7 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PREsmNn-s 3206, 3210 (1897).
187. Brant, supra note 20, at 28. See also Merry, supra note 20, at 69; Ratner, supra note
20, at 158.
188. Brant, supra note 20, at 28. The sole "descent" of this congressional "dagger" was
the Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44, which excised a portion of the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction.
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both because of the practical difficulties that would attend con-
gressional contraction of federal jurisdiction and because of the
moderating tendencies of a Constitution structured so that the
popular branches can seldom act "on any other principles than
those of justice and the general good."' 18 9
The practical difficulties that would accompany withdrawal of
jurisdiction are considerable. First, federal courts are essential to
the administration of federal law and the enforcement of coercive
sanctions and private remedies. If Congress were to withdraw all
jurisdiction from the federal courts, save only the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction, the final resolution of virtually all questions of
federal law, constitutional and otherwise, would rest with the high-
est courts of the fifty states. The potential for inconsistency in
their resolution of federal questions is so great, and the practical
costs of such inconsistency are so high, that Congress is not likely
to withdraw all federal jurisdiction, even though it is authorized by
article III, section 2 to do so. If, in recognition of these constraints,
the Congress decided to curtail only the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, it would find that it had succeeded only in reducing,
but by no means eliminating, the potential for national inconsis-
tency. The final resolution of all constitutional questions would
then be left to the twelve federal courts of appeal and the
probability of inconsistency in their decisions would still remain
great.' Finally, if the Congress were to exercise its exceptions
powers even more exactingly and were selectively to deprive the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review only particular classes of
cases such as busing, school prayer, or abortion, the tradition of
stare decisis could lead the lower federal and state courts to follow
the Supreme Court decisions that originally prompted the congres-
sional contraction:
[The courts] would still be faced with the decisions of the Su-
preme Court as precedents-decisions which that Court would
now be quite unable to reverse or modify or even to explain. The
189. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 353 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
190. Wechsler, supra note 14, at 1006. It must be remembered, however, that if lack of
uniformity among fifty states or twelve circuits concerning constitutional interpretation
were to become a problem, congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction could easily be repealed
by statute.
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jurisdictional withdrawal thus might work to freeze the very
doctrines that had prompted its enactment, placing an intolera-
ble moral burden on the lower courts. 1 '
All of this is likely to convince Congress that "the federal system
needs federal courts and the judicial institution needs an organ of
supreme authority."192
These practical difficulties, however, are not great enough either
to reassure those fearful of Congress' power under the exceptions
clause or to discourage those who would have Congress exercise
this power. Sager regards contractions of Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion as "lewd winks" cast by the Congress in the state courts' di-
rection, and he worries that state courts will be seduced to "dis-
honor federal precedent and refuse to recognize disfavored
rights.1193 Professor Rice inquires: "What will be the practical ef-
fect of withdrawing jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts? 11 94 His answer, which employs the school
prayer issue as an example, is hardly comforting to Sager:
Unlike a constitutional amendment, such a withdrawal would
not reverse the Supreme Court's rulings on school prayer. Pre-
sumably, at least some state courts would strictly follow those
decisions as the last authoritative Supreme Court pronounce-
ment on the subject. But a new law would ensure that the Court
received no opportunity to further extend its errors.
It may be expected, however, that some state courts would
openly disregard the Supreme Court precedents and decide in
favor of school prayer once the prospect of reversal by the Su-
preme Court had been removed. But that result would not be
such a terrible thing .... [because state courts merely would be
reversing] ... Supreme Court decisions which ... would ap-
pear so erroneous as to be virtually usurpations.
[B]ecause a statute rather than a constitutional amendment is
involved, the Court's jurisdiction could readily be restored
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1007. See also J. CHOPER, supra note 20, at 54.
193. Sager, supra note 3, at 41, 68.
194. Rice, supra note 70, at 197.
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should the need for it become apparent. 19 5
Although the practical difficulties attending jurisdictional con-
tractions may or may not prove reassuring, those fearful of Con-
gress' power to make exceptions should take considerable comfort
in the fact that the Constitution is so designed and constructed as
to render remote the prospect that Congress will exercise this ex-
pressly granted power either frequently or fully. Congress has only
once succeeded in passing legislation excising a portion of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction,' and this occurred in the post-Civil
War period against a Court whose last exercise of judicial review
was in the notorious Dred Scott v. Sandford 97 decision and whose
membership included several justices who were on public record as
believing that the Reconstruction program was unconstitutional.,
Moreover, this excision was carried out neither with a meat-ax nor
even with Brant's "dagger,"' 99 but with a scalpel; Congress elimi-
nated only one procedure for Supreme Court review of the ques-
tion at issue, but left an alternate review procedure untouched.
Congress historically has acted quite responsibly toward the Court.
It has abused neither its ability to make exceptions nor its other
powers to curb the Court.0 0 Such historical respect for the func-
tions of the Court is hardly accidental.
V. CONCLUSION
The framers of the Constitution recognized that a dependence
on the people and on their representative institutions was essential
in a democratic republic. They nevertheless were aware of the need
195. Id.
196. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44.
197. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
198. See Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 233-44. See also 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNrrED STATES HiSTORY 193 n.1 (1922).
199. See supra text accompanying note 188.
200. The exceptions clause is not the only means by which Congress can attempt to curb
the Court. For example, Congress also has power to impeach the justices; to destroy the
Court's effectiveness by substantially increasing or reducing the size of its membership; to
limit tenure either through constitutional amendment or statutory inducements; to reduce
or eliminate staff support for the Court; to refuse salary increases for the justices in infla-
tionary times; to require extraordinary majorities to invalidate statutes; and to require that
the justices file seriatim opinions in all cases. See W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 63
(1962). See also R. SToAmR, Tim SUPREME COURT IN CRISIS: A HISTORY OF CoNLicT (1971).
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for precautions to insure that the people not only ruled, but that
they ruled well.201 One of the precautions upon which they relied
was an independent judiciary exercising the traditional form of ju-
dicial review as articulated in The Federalist, No. 78202 and as in-
stituted in Marbury v. Madison, °0 thereby keeping the representa-
tive branches "within the limits assigned to their authority."2 04
The framers were well aware, however, that this precaution
posed a potential threat to the political rights of the Constitution.
In this regard, the Court was the least dangerous of the three
branches, but it too could annoy and injure the rights and liberties
of the people.20 5 The Court also had to be restrained, even as it was
used to restrain others. One means by which the framers sought to
restrain the Court was by granting to Congress the power to make
exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The framers did
not fear that Congress would abuse this power, unrestrained as it
was by judicial review, for they had set in place against the tyran-
nical tendencies of the Congress a variety of auxiliary precautions,
including separation of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism,
staggered elections, federalism, and the moderating effect of a mul-
tiplicity of interests present in an extended republic.
For nearly two centuries, these precautions have worked exceed-
ingly well. The Congress has acted responsibly, and the Court, ever
mindful of the consequences that might be visited upon it if it
were to attempt to substitute its pleasure for that of the legislative
body, 0 ' generally has resisted the temptation to act as "a bevy of
Platonic Guardians. '20 7 There is every reason to believe that these
precautions will continue to work well, provided only that the let-
ter of the Constitution-which is, after all, the very source of these
precautions-remains central and governing in the minds of those
who study and practice the law, and is not subordinated by them
201. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). These precautions
would help to insure that the government would always reflect "the permanent and aggre-
gate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961).
202. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
203. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Wolfe, supra note 122, at 293-99.
204. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
205. Id. at 522.
206. Id. at 526.
207. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1965).
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to the activist view which distills the very essence of the judicial
role and constitutional legitimacy from the spirit of judicial review.
